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12 June 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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Uruguay: The expected replacement of Uruguayan UN Ambassador Velasquez may signal a change in the role Uruguay has been playing at the UN.

The National Council of Government (NCG) has voted unanimously to censure Velasquez for his recent harsh attack on the US and President Johnson during the Security Council discussions on the Dominican Republic. Several NCG members have demanded that Velasquez be recalled to Montevideo.

Velasquez has consistently embarrassed the US by his initiatives and attitude in the Security Council debates on the Dominican crisis. He has also irritated his Latin American colleagues by his attempts to broaden UN involvement in the Dominican Republic at the expense of the Organization of American States. According to the NCG president, he exceeded his instructions.

The NCG's action evidently stems in part from its gratitude for the prompt representations the US made to Brazil and Argentina recently after Brazilian press attacks on Uruguay. These attacks had led to Uruguayan fears that Brazil might seize on the Dominican crisis as a precedent for intervention in Uruguay.

Britain: Ministerial-level talks to determine Britain's long-range defense commitments begin this week end↓

The first phase of the defense review probably will concentrate on saving money without cutting existing commitments. These economies, as well as some juggling of costs within the budget, are designed in part to placate left-wing Laborites who are demanding a ten percent (\$560 million) reduction in defense spending. Individual decisions probably will be announced piecemeal to Parliament before the summer recess.

The more critical second phase will determine what British defense commitments should be in the 1970s, and what sort of forces will be needed to meet them. Key questions will be nuclear capability; NATO commitments (specifically the British Army of the Rhine); ability to maintain key overseas bases, especially Aden and Singapore; the role of aircraft carriers; and aircraft requirements/

The government is reported insistent that this time military strategy, based on the outcome of this review, is to determine equipment needs rather than itself be determined by the equipment available.

Extensive consultations with the US and other allies will be required before decisions on the second phase can be made. The British are pressing to have NATO count their overseas commitments as part of their contribution to over-all Western defense. They almost certainly will ask Allied and Commonwealth help in carrying this burden.

Major decisions on the second phase are unlikely before late fall, in part because there may be some

(continued)

footdragging in the Ministry of Defense. The US Embassy in London feels that some civil servants, who do not think such far-reaching decisions should be taken by a government with Labor's shaky future, may try to impede the government's efforts.

Cyprus: Exchanges between Greek and Turkish officials are slowly narrowing the wide gap between the two countries' positions!

Discussions are now focused on providing the Turks with territorial compensation for allowing Cyprus to unite with Greece. In agreeing to consider such union--a departure from Ankara's past stand--the Turks demanded compensation equivalent to 20 percent of the island's area, either on Cyprus itself or in Greece. This 20 percent roughly corresponds with the portion of the Cypriot population which is Turkish↓

The Greeks have offered minor border rectifications in Thrace or to lease the Turks a military base on Cyprus. The Urguplu government, which is especially cautious in view of the imminence of national elections this fall, presumably will consider this insufficient.

The Greek Cypriots could still prove a stumbling block to any agreement between Athens and Ankara. They adamantly oppose any territorial concession, including a leased base, in return for enosis. President Makarios may be more inclined to accept the establishment of a NATO base at which Turks might be stationed. He may hold discussions with Turkish Premier Urguplu, whom he knows personally, at the upcoming Afro-Asian conference in Algiers./

Cyprus itself remains relatively quiet. The Greek Cypriots apparently will extend the terms of office of present officials rather than hold scheduled elections this summer which could have increased tension between the communities.

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a few Egyptian missile personnel have arrived on the island. SA-2 missileassociated equipment has been on the island for several months, but there is no confirmation that missiles themselves are present.

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\*Cuba: Che Guevara reportedly has been replaced as Cuba's Minister of Industries.

Guevara will be succeeded by his deputy minister but Che's new job has not yet been announced, according to press reports from Havana. Cuba's ambassador to Mexico told a group of students in Mexico City on 9 June that Guevara would shortly be given a new post in the Cuban hierarchy.

Guevara has been conspicuously absent from public view since his 14 March return from a three-month tour of Africa and Communist China. His disappearance has produced a spate of rumors in Havana concerning his whereabouts and his relationship with Fidel Castro.

The possibility that Guevara has fallen into disfavor cannot be altogether ruled out, but it seems more likely that he will continue to play an important role in Castro's regime. Castro has mentioned Guevara's contributions to the rebel cause during the fight against Batista in two recent speeches, and earlier had publicly spoken highly of Guevara's talents. The Cuban ambassador in Mexico City also lauded Guevara as one of the 'most famous and representative leaders' of the Cuban revolution.

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NOTES

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Britain: Prime Minister Wilson's majority in Parliament has been temporarily reduced to one by the illness of two Labor MP's, one of whom will be sidelined for the summer. Should the Conservatives agree to provide pairs for the sick MP's it will be a further indication that Douglas-Home does not intend at this time to force Wilson to an early election. In any case the narrowness of Labor's majority could endanger controversial sections of its vitally important finance bill.

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Chile: The majority Christian Democratic Party has joined with Communists, Socialists, and Radicals in passing a resolution in the Chamber of Deputies which condemns US policy in the Dominican Republic and asks President Frei to recognize the "legitimate constitutional government" of Colonel Caamano. Although Frei has, thus far, declined to follow the desire of much of his Christian Democratic Party for recognition of the Caamano regime because such action could isolate Chile in the OAS, this resolution could force him to reconsider.

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USSR: The USSR may step up its purchases of Western industrial plants and equipment this fall, according to several Western commercial counselors in Moscow. The counselors note that there is little negotiating activity for such plants and equipment at present, but they believe this will change as Soviet import priorities are set for the next five-year plan (1966-1970). Moscow's industrial purchases fell off in the wake of the 1963 agricultural failure, which necessitated large grain imports.

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